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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A SYSTEMATIC METHOD FOR
EVALUATING EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY AND
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment protects criminal
defendants from retrial for the same offense after conviction or acquittal.2
When a jury finds a defendant not guilty, the acquittal unconditionally
prevents a government appeal and subsequent retrial.' The United States
Supreme Court, however, has not clarified whether reversal of a jury's
guilty verdict prohibits a second prosecution.4 If the trial judge or ap-
pellate court reverses a jury's guilty verdict because the prosecution failed
to present sufficient evidence, the acquittal bars retrial.3 The Supreme
' U.S. CONST. amend V. The fifth amendment provides in part: " ... nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ......
The double jeopardy clause applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Ben-
ton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Double jeopardy protections have
ancient origins. See 1 DEMOSTHENES 589 (J. Vince trans. 4th ed. 1979). See generally Com-
ment, Double Jeopardy and Post-Verdict Judgments of Acquittal, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
669, 670 n.2 (1983) (development of double jeopardy protection). Double jeopardy prevents
successive prosecution by preserving the finality of convictions. See United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) (preservation of finality of judgment is design and
purpose of double jeopardy clause); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (double
jeopardy protects finality of judgments); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (double jeopardy
protects integrity of final judgments); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (policy
of finality in double jeopardy protects defendant's interests); Bozza v. United States, 330
U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947) (acquittals have qualities of constitutional finality not present in senten-
cing). But see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969) (no constitutional limitation
on retrial following defendant's successful appeal of conviction). Acquitted defendants receive
double jeopardy protection barring retrial. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)
(double jeopardy bars retrial when acquittal based on insufficient evidence); Sanabria v.
United States, 437 US. 54, 68-69 (1978) (double jeopardy bars retrial when erroneous eviden-
tiary ruling leads to acquittal for insufficient evidence); United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 576 (1977) (acquittal bars retrial even though mistrial might permit sec-
ond trial); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 353 (1975) (government appeal of post-
verdict acquittal allowed only if defendant cannot be retried); Fong Foo v. United States,
369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (preverdict acquittal affirmed even though based on egregiously
erroneous foundation); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (jury verdict of ac-
quittal is final and ends defendant's jeopardy); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)
(jury verdict of acquittal not reviewable as error or otherwise).
I Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). Jury verdicts of acquittal are
unreviewable. Id.; Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government
Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 U. MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1010 (1980). Even if the jury er-
roneously acquits the accused, a jury verdict legally represents a factual finding of innocence
barring reversal. Id.
See infra, notes 17-25, 110 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 17-25.
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Court recently ruled that a reversal based on weight of the evidence is
not an acquittal barring retrial.'
The difference between sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the
evidence is elusive.7 An acquittal based on weight of the evidence falls
between evidence so insufficient that no rational factfinder could find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt and evidence sufficient for any rational fact-
finder to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,' In Jackson v. Virginia,'
the Supreme Court formulated the standard for review of the evidentiary
sufficiency supporting a jury's guilty verdict." The Jackson Court noted
that the presumption of a defendant's innocence requires proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." The trial judge or appellate court must decide
See infra text accompanying notes 27-45.
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 44-45 (1982) (defendant argued that distinction between
weight of evidence and sufficiency of evidence is nebulous); see infra text accompanying
notes 46-53 (difficulty of applying distinction between weight of evidence and sufficiency
of evidence). But see infra note 115 (Supreme Court in Tibbs rejected petitioner's arguments
that distinction between weight of evidence and sufficiency of evidence is unworkable).
Legally sufficient evidence is the quantum of evidence necessary for a reviewing body to
find that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of
fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
324-26 (1979); see infra text accompanying notes 9-16 (Jackson standard of review for suffi-
ciency of evidence). A finding of legally insufficient evidence results in acquittal for the
defendant. 443 U.S. at 324-26. Weight of the evidence is legally sufficient evidence that
may indicate that the reviewing body, acting as a thirteenth juror, disagrees with the jury's
verdict of guilty. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982); see notes 26-45 and accompanying
text (discussion of Tibbs). If the reviewing body determines that the weight of the evidence
is against the jury's verdict of guilty, the trial judge may grant the defendant a new trial. Id.
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-42 (1982).
443 U.S. 307 (1979).
'o Id. at 324-26. In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court must review
the defendant's motion for acquittal in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution preserves the factfinder's tradi-
tional role of weighing the evidence. Id. at 319. The trial judge or appellate court makes
a legal conclusion about whether all of the evidence supports the factfinder's conclusion
that the defendant was guilty. Id. The reviewing body must decide whether any rational
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 324-26.
If no rational factfinder could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence
is legally insufficient and the court must grant the defendant's motion for acquittal. Id.;
see infra text accompanying notes 11-15 (discussion of Jackson).
11 443 U.S. at 309; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (criminal prosecution
requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). In Jackson, the defendant confessed
to an accidental killing, but claimed self-defense. 443 U.S. at 311. The trial judge, sitting
without a jury, convicted the defendant of first degree murder. Id. at 309. The Virginia
Supreme Court denied the defendant's appeal concerning insufficient evidence of specific
intent. Id at 311. The defendant fied a habeas corpus petition in federal district court claiming
the prosecution had produced no evidence of specific intent at trial. Id at 312. The district
court granted the peitition and the Fourth Circuit reversed. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirm-
ed the existence of some evidence of specific intent since the defendant reloaded the gun
and shot again at close range, the defendant was not as intoxicated as he claimed, and
the defendant immediately fled from Virginia to North Carolina. Id. at 312, 325. The Supreme
Court affirmed that a rational factfinder could have found Jackson guilty of first-degree
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 324.
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whether any rational trier of fact could find proof of the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.12 In reaching a conclusion about
sufficiency of the evidence, a court should consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution."3 The evidentiary sufficiency in-
quiry does not require the court to weigh sufficiency of the evidence on
the basis of the court's personal opinion." The jury is the factfinding body
responsible for resolving conflicting testimony and weighing evidence ."
If the reviewing court finds that no rational trier of fact could have found
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court must rule that the evidence
is insufficient and acquit the defendant."6
In Burks v. United States," the Supreme Court applied the Jackson
standard in considering whether the double jeopardy clause bars retrial
after an appellate court has found that legally insufficient evidence re-
quired an acquittal. 8 In Burks, the defendant asserted insanity as a defense
to bank robbery. 9 Defense counsel presented three expert witnesses and
the prosecution called two rebuttal witnesses.6 The jury returned a guilty
verdict." The Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, ruling that the govern-
1 443 U.S. at 324.
Id. In Jackson, the Supreme Court emphasized that the factfinder must first resolve
conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts. Id. Then, the court must review the factfinder's conclusion by considering
all evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Id.; see, e.g., Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (jury verdict stands if substantial evidentiary support when
viewed in light most favorable to government to determine whether reasonably minded
jury could find the defendant guilty); United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516, 521 (10th
Cir. 1971) (court should view evidence in light most favorable to government to determine
whether substantial evidence existed for the jury to find defendant guilty).
14 443 U.S. at 319. In Jackson, the Supreme Court ruled that a motion based on eviden-
tiary insufficiency does not require the court to inquire into whether the jury's verdict
is believable. Id. Instead, the court must make the legal inquiry whether any rational fact-
finder could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see
supra note 10 (Jackson standard for determination of evidentiary sufficiency).
,1 443 U.S. at 310; see supra note 13; infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (jury
is traditional factfinding body, therefore judges and appellate courts should defer to jury's
factual determinations and v~rdicts).
11 443 U.S. at 324-26; see supra note 10 (Jackson standard of review for evidentiary
sufficiency).
17 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
11 Id. at 4.
,1 Id. at 2.
2 Id. at 3. In Burks, the three expert witnesses for the defense testified that Burks
suffered from a mental illness at the time of the robbery. Id. The mental illness rendered
Burks substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the lawful requirements of society.
Id. Both government rebuttal witnesses acknowledged Burks' character disorder. Id. One
state witness testified that Burks was not mentally ill. Id. The second prosecution witness
answered ambiguously concerning whether Burks could conform his conduct to the con-
fines of the law. Id. The state also used lay witness testimony to prove that Burks was
capable of functioning normally at the time of the robbery.
11 Id. In Burks, the trial judge denied the defendant's preverdict motions for acquittal
and new trial. Id. Burks moved post-verdict for a new trial partially on the grounds of
insufficient evidence. Id. The trial judge also denied the motion for new trial. Id.
16211983]
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ment did not present evidence legally sufficient to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.22 When the government appealed the Sixth Circuit
decision, the Supreme Court held that the only permissible remedy was
a directed verdict of acquittal. 3 The Burks Court reasoned that when the
government fails to present sufficient evidence, the trial judge should ac-
quit the defendant before submitting the case to the jury.u In short, double
jeopardy bars retrial once an appellate court finds the evidence legally
insufficient to justify a conviction.
The Supreme Court recently distinguished reversals based on legally
insufficient evidence from reversals based on weight of the evidence. 6
In Tibbs v. Florida," the Florida Supreme Court, citing six weaknesses
in the government's case, 8 reversed a jury verdict finding the defendant
' Id. In Burks, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 4.
The Sixth Circuit stated that the prosecutor's evidence of Burks' mental condition did not
effectively rebut Burks' evidence of insanity. Id. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the govern-
ment must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt after the defendant presents a prima
facie defense of insanity. Id. at 3; see United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 852-53 (5th Cir.
1974) (trial judge must determine sufficiency of insanity evidence after government has
opportunity to present additional rebuttal evidence of defendant's sanity). On remand, the
district court considered whether a directed verdict of acquittal or a new trial was the
appropriate course of action. 437 U.S. at 4.
437 U.S. at 18. In Burks, the Supreme Court overruled all prior decisions suggesting
that a defendant's motion for a new trial waives his right to a judgment of acquittal. Id.
The Supreme Court did not overrule specifically any cases by name, but stated the general
principle that a defendant does not waive his acquittal right. Id. Since the Sixth Circuit
found the evidence legally insufficient, the Supreme Court directed the district court to
enter a judgment of acquittal. Id.
I Id. at 16. The Burks Court stated that when the prosecutor fails to prove the defend-
ant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the state cannot claim prejudice. Id. The govern-
ment has had a fair opportunity to assemble and offer proof. Id. An acquittal based on
legally insufficient evidence indicates that the state did not have a position worthy of jury
consideration. Id. If proof of guilt was lacking as a matter of law, a jury could not have
returned a guilty verdict. Id.
Id. at 18; see supra notes 23 & 24 (acquittal for insufficient prosecution evidence
bars retrial).
' See infra text accompanying notes 35-39 (Supreme Court's decision and reasoning
in Tibbs v. Florida).
457 U.S. 31 (1982).
Id. at 35-36. In Tibbs, the Florida Supreme Court identified the following weaknesses
in the government's case: (1) the state presented no evidence placing Tibbs near the scene
of the crime, except for the prosecutrix's testimony; (2) police never found the killer's truck;
(3) police never found the killer's gun or car keys; (4) the defendant cooperated fully with
the police; (5) the defendant presented unrebutted evidence concerning his reputation for
veracity; and (6) the state cast doubt on the prosecutrix's believability. Id.
I Id. In Tibbs, the state's chief witness, Nadeau, testified that a man in a green truck
picked up her and her boyfriend near Fort Myers. Id. at 32. The driver stopped the truck
to siphon gas and forced Nadeau to engage in sodomy with him. Id. The driver then shot
the boyfriend, wounding him in the shoulder. Id. After taunting the boyfriend, the driver
killed him with a single shot to the head. Id. The driver raped Nadeau, who left the scene
with the driver, promising to be his "old lady". Id. Nadeau escaped after the driver stopped
the truck. Id. Several days later, the police stopped Tibbs, who was hitchhiking near Ocala,
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guilty of first degree murder and rape.' The appellate court stated that
the weight of the evidence did not prove adequately the defendant's guilt 0
and therefore concluded that the defendant deserved a new trial.' Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f) requires review of sufficiency and
weight of the evidence in capital cases.2 The Florida Supreme Court ruled
that the reversal resulted from insufficient weight of the evidence rather
than insufficient evidence.3 A reversal based on insufficient evidence in-
dicates that no rational factfinder could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and requires the court to direct a verdict of acquittal.1
4
A weight of the evidence reversal is a determination that a greater amount
of credible evidence supports one side than the other. '- Evidentiary suffi-
Florida. Id. Nadeau identified Tibbs as the driver from police photos. Id. The defense at-
tempted to discredit Nadeau through evidence that Nadeau had smoked marijuana shortly
before the crimes occurred. Id. at 34. Tibbs attempted to bolster his credibility by denying
ownership of the truck, stating that he was in Daytona Beach at the time of the crime,
and emphasizing his college education. Id. The jury convicted Tibbs of first degree murder
and rape. Id. at 35. The judge followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Tibbs
to death. Id.
Id. at 35-37.
", Id. at 37. The Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs ruled that the weaknesses in the
government's case created doubt that the defendant was guilty. Tibbs v. State, 337 So.
2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1976); 457 U.S. at 37; see supra note 29 (six weaknesses in the prosecution's
case). In a special concurrence, Justice Boyd noted that the standard for a new trial was
whether a jury of reasonable men could have returned the verdict. Id. at 36; see Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (proper standard for new trial is whether rational fact-
finder could have found defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt).
32FLA. R. App. P. 6.16(b) (1962) (recodified as FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(f) (Supp. 1982));
457 U.S. at 36 n.8. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f) provides in part:
In capital cases, the court shall review the evidence to determine if the interest
of justice requires a new trial, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence is
an issue presented for review. FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(f) (Supp. 1982).
In Greene v. Massey, the companion case to Burks v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held that reversal of a guilty verdict based on trial error does not bar retrial.
437 U.S. 19, 26 (1978). The Florida Supreme Court in Greene, however, reversed the jury's
verdict of guilty and ordered a new trial because the state's evidence was legally insuffi-
cient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sosa v. State, 215 So. 2d 736, 737 (Fla.
1968) (per curiam). The Florida District Court in Greene had held that Florida appellate
rules permit retrial when the weight of the evidence is weak, although the evidence is
legally sufficient to convict. Sosa v. Maxwell, 234 So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970);
FLA. R. App. P. 6.16(b) (1962). In Greene, the United States Supreme Court apparently relied
on the special concurrence discussing trial error rather than the per curiam opinion stating
insufficient evidence as justification for a new trial. See Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19,
25 (1978) (three of four Florida Supreme Court justices qualified per curiam opinion with
special concurrence).
' Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1126 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
U Id. at 1123; see supra text accompanying notes 9-16 (Jackson standard of review for
evidentiary sufficiency).
' Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981). The trier of fact may find that
a greater amount of credible evidence supports acquittal than conviction even though a
rational factfinder could have viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the pros-
ecution and found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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ciency is a legal determination while weight of the evidence is a credibil-
ity determination.6 A credibility evaluation requires the reviewing body
to act as a thirteenth juror to make a factual judgment concerning the
weight of the evidence. 7 In Florida, Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f)
established that reversals based on weight of the evidence do not bar
retrial.'
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Tibbs interpretation
of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f) that reversals based on
weight of the evidence permit retrial. 9 The Supreme Court accepted the
Florida court's distinction between insufficient evidence and weight of
the evidence, reasoning that a reversal on the weight of the evidence in-
dicates that acquittal was not the only possible verdict. 0 The Tibbs Court
recognized that the Florida appellate court did not acquit the defendant,
but granted the accused a new trial4" because the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence.42 Weight of the evidence reversals do not deserve
the deference normally accorded acquittals.3 A reversal based on weight
of the evidence does not signify that the evidence was legally insufficient
to convict, but rather that the appellate court acted as a thirteenth juror
and disagreed with the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence and
testimony." Just as a deadlocked jury does not acquit a defendant and
bar retrial, an appellate court's reversal based on weight of the evidence
does not prevent a second trial.45
36 Id.
'7 Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 44-45 (ap-
pellate court acting as thirteenth juror).
" See supra note 32 (Florida courts' application of FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(f)).
39 457 U.S. 31, 46-47. In Tibbs, the Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the
trial court for retrial. Id. at 36. On remand, the trial court dismissed the indictment relying
on Burks v. United States. Id. at 37-38; see 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (double jeopardy bars retrial
once appellate court has found state's evidence legally insufficient); see also supra notes
17-25 (discussion of Burks). The government appealed the dismissal of the indictment to
an intermediate appellate court. Tibbs v. State, 370 So. 2d 386 (1979). On further appeal,
the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate appellate court's decision to remand
the case for retrial. Tibbs v. State, - Fla. -,.. 397 So. 2d 1120, 1127 (Fla. 1980)
(per curiam). See supra text accompanying notes 34-37 (Florida Supreme Court's distinction
between weight of evidence and sufficiency of evidence).
,0 457 U.S. 31, 41-43.
', Id. at 46-47.
42 Id.
Id. at 42; see infra note 86 (special weight given acquittals).
" 457 U.S. at 42-43.
1 Id. at 42. The appellate court's difference of opinion with the jury is the same as
jurors' differences of opinion among themselves. Id. A deadlocked jury results in a "manifest
necessity" retrial, not an acquittal barring retrial. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
579, 580 (1824). Likewise, an acquittal based on weight of the evidence does not bar retrial.
457 U.S. at 42-43.
When a trial judge terminates the proceedings because of manifest necessity, the need
for renewed adjudication supersedes a defendant's interest in repose. United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980). A jury unable to decide on a verdict is the classic
[Vol. 40:1619
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A reversal based on weight of the evidence affords both the defend-
ant and the government another opportunity to resolve guilt or innocence
to the satisfaction of the appellate court, a neutral third party.46 Although
the distinction between weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the
evidence seems simple, the difference is unclear in application.4" For ex-
justification for allowing retrial on manifest necessity grounds. See Keerl v. Montana, 213
U.S. 135, 136 (1909) (hung jury was manifest necessity allowing retrial); Dreyer v. Illinois,
187 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1902) (same); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892) (same).
In other circumstances, the prosecutor must prove the manifest necessity when the
government moves for a mistrial over the defendant's objection. See Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). In Washington, the Supreme Court allowed retrial because the
record adequately disclosed the judge's reasons for granting a mistrial, although the trial
judge did not state specifically the words "manifest necessity." Id. at 516-17. The Washington
trial, court granted a mistrial because defense counsel referred during jury selection and
opening statements to prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence at the prior trial.
Id. at 498-99.
In Illinois v. Somerville, the Supreme Court ruled that an insufficient indictment was
the manifest necessity underlying a mistrial ruling. 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973). The Somerville
Court reasoned that manifest necessity justifies retrial when either party could have upset
the verdict at will. Id.; cf. Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199, 200-202 (1916) (manifest
necessity justified mistrial because defendant had not pleaded to indictment after demur-
rer overruled); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 273-74 (1894) (manifest necessity
mistrial after juror dismissed as having been member of indicting grand jury); Simmons
v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 148-50 (1891) (mistrial after dismissal of jury on grounds
that one juror acquainted with defendant). Courts should invoke the manifest necessity
doctrine whenever public justice demands discharge of a jury. United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). Before allowing retrial on manifest necessity grounds, the
court must consider all relevant circumstances. Id.
6 See supra notes 5, 6, 2645 and accompanying text (acquittals based on weight of
evidence permit retrial while acquittals for insufficient evidence bar retrial).
Courts should grant new trials only after balancing a criminal defendant's interest in
a fair trial against society's interest in punishing the guilty. Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1, 15 (1978). In Burks, the Supreme Court emphasized that society's interest in convict-
ing the guilty necessitates that courts refuse to grant defendants immunity from punish-
ment for every reversible error. Id.; cf. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129
(1980) (strong public interest in finality of judgments does not bar retrial when acquittal
based on egregiously erroneous foundation); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343-44
n.11 (1975) (courts should only allow retrial with reluctance); United States v. Tateo, 377
U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (societal interest in granting immunity from punishment); Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949) (same); United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 772 (3d Cir. 1982)
(society has interest in insuring that guilty are punished). See generally Note, Double Jeopardy:
A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 365, 370
(1964). Conversely, the defendant has an interest in ending the ordeal of criminal prosecu-
tion. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957); see Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204,
216-18 (1978) (defendant's interest in ending prosecution); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 486 (1971) (same); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970); United States v. Kuck,
573 F.2d 25, 27 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Beckerman, 516 F.2d 905, 906 (2d
Cir. 1975) (same); Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7, 12 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1023 (1973). But see United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769,772 (3d Cir. 1982) (defendant
has interest in readjudication that is free from error).
11 See supra note 7 (elusive distinction between weight of evidence and insufficient
evidence).
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ample, the defendant's guilt or innocence often turns on witness
credibility.48 In Burks, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's find-
ing that the prosecution had not presented evidence legally sufficient to
convict the defendant.49 The legal insufficiency in Burks resulted from
failure of the prosecution's rebuttal witnesses to impugn the credibility
of the defense witnesses."0 Since the pivitol issue in Burks, as in Tibbs,
was witness credibility,". the Supreme Court could have reversed Burks
on weight of the evidence and allowed retrial.2 A second prosecution would
have permitted Burks the same opportunity as Tibbs to bolster the
credibility of the defense witnesses, thereby strengthening the defense
case in a readjudication of guilt or innocence. 3 The Burks Court did not
consider the possibility of a new trial on the basis of insufficient weight
of the evidence.54 As in Jackson, the Burks Court referred to the evidence
only in terms of sufficiency or insufficiency.55 The Court affirmed that the
evidence was insufficient and acquitted the defendant, preventing retrial.'
Relying on the Sixth Circuit's evaluation, the Supreme Court focused on
the issue of whether a finding of legally insufficient evidence permitted
retrial." The Supreme Court did not consider the weight of the evidence
to determine whether the defendant deserved a new trial since the Court
deferred to the Sixth Circuit's judgment.
48 E.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 3 (1978) (battle of defense and government
expert witnesses determined whether defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity); United
States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (8th Cir. 1980) (jury's not guilty verdict turned
on believability of defendant's story as opposed to plausibility of victim's friends' and family's
version of events leading to death); United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 36-37 (4th Cir.
1969) (jury found stepfather guilty of raping stepdaughter after weighing credibility of step-
father, prosecutrix, and mother).
"9 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes
17-25 (discussion of Burks).
0 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1978); see supra note 20 (witness' testimony
in Burks).
1, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1978); see Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 35-36
(1982) (six weaknesses in state's case constituted lack of physical evidence that forced jury
to decide whether prosecutrix or defendant was more credible); supra note 28 (Tibbs Court
identified six weaknesses in government's case).
m See supra text accompanying notes 48-51 (Burks evidentiary sufficiency problem very
similar to Tibbs witness credibility issue).
See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 43-44 n.19, (1982).
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1978). In Burks, the Sixth Circuit ruled
that the government's evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury verdict of guilty.
United States v. Burks, 547 F.2d 968, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1976). See infra text accompanying
notes 57-58 (Supreme Court relied on Sixth Circuit's ruling and did not consider weight
of evidence).
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1978).
Id. at 17-18. In Burks, the Supreme Court held that a finding of legally insufficient
evidence bars retrial, even though the defendant has moved for a new trial. Id. at 17. The
Burks Court emphasized that a defendant's motion for a new trial does not constitute a
waiver of his right to a judgment of acquittal based on evidentiary insufficiency. Id. at 18.




In Hudson v. Louisiana,59 the Supreme Court first suggested that a
trial judge could evaluate evidence to determine weight as well as
sufficiency." The Hudson Court held that the trial judge granted a new
trial based on insufficient evidence in the original prosecution." The new
trial ruling, therefore, was the equivalent of an acquittal and barred
retrial.' The Supreme Court, however, continued the analysis, suggesting
that if the trial judge has acted as a thirteenth juror and weighed the
evidence, the judge could have granted a new trial even though the
evidence was legally sufficient to support a guilty verdict.63
Following the Hudson analysis, the Tibbs Court considered weight and
sufficiency as the two possibilities for evidentiary analysis when a defend-
ant moves for new trial or acquittal after a jury verdict of guilty. 4 After
Tibbs, the trial judge should consider the evidence systematically as if
the defendant had made both motions. First, the trial judge should deter-
mine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to survive the defendant's
motion to acquit.6 If the evidence is insufficient according to the Jackson
standard, 7 the trial judge must acquit the defendant and the double jeop-
450 U.S. 40 (1981).
I d. at 44; see infra text accompanying notes 61-63 (Hudson suggests trial judge could
function as thirteenth juror and weigh evidence).
1, Id. at 44-45. In Hudson, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Id. at 41. Hudson moved
for a new trial because a new trial motion was the only available avenue of challenging
evidentiary sufficiency under Louisiana law. Id. The court granted a new trial and the sec-
ond jury also convicted Hudson. Id. 41-42. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge
granted the motion for new trial on the basis of legally insufficient evidence. Id. at 43-44.
The trial judge, therefore, did not decide as a thirteenth juror that the weight of the evidence
did not support the jury's verdict. Id. at 44.
"2 Id. at 44. The Hudson Court held that when a trial court grants a motion for new
trial on the grounds of insufficient evidence, double jeopardy bars retrial. Id. In Hudson,
the state had ample opportunity to offer proof of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 43; see Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (when state has fair chance to offer proof of guilt,
double jeopardy bars retrial).
1 450 U.S. at 44-45. In Hudson, the Supreme Court held that no significant facts
distinguished Hudson from Burks. Id. The Supreme Court suggested that if Hudson had
been distinguishable from Burks, the trial judge could have weighed the evidence as a thir-
teenth juror and granted a new trial. Id. at 44 n.5.
" See supra text accompanying notes 26-45 (Tibbs Court distinguished weight of evidence
from sufficiency of evidence).
I Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1978). See United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). In Martin Linen, the Supreme Court determined that
the form of the trial judge's action does not determine whether the ruling is an acquittal.
Id. If the judge's decision represents a resolution of some or all of the factual elements
of the crime, the appellate court can determine whether the action was an acquittal or
not, regardless of the label. Id. The trial court can grant an acquittal on the defendant's
motion or on the court's own motion. FED. R. CRI. P. 29(a); see infra text accompanying
notes 66-77 (systematic method for evaluation of motions for new trial and acquittal).
" See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1978) (determination of evidentiary
insufficiency leads to judgment of acquittal, making evaluation of motion for new trial
unnecessary).
I See supra note 10 (Jackson standard of review for sufficiency of evidence).
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ardy clause bars retrial." If the evidence is legally sufficient to support
the jury's verdict of guilty, the trial judge should then consider the defend-
ant's motion for a new trial."9 When evaluating the necessity for a new
trial, the trial judge must assume the factfinding functions of a thirteenth
juror.10 After weighing evidence and witness credibility, the trial judge
should grant a new trial if the weight of the evidence does not support
the jury's verdict of guilty." If the weight of the evidence favors the jury's
verdict of guilty, the trial judge should affirm the conviction and deny
the defendant's motion for a new trial.
7 2
The defendant may appeal the trial judge's denial of an acquittal or
a new trial.73 The appellate court should retrace the steps of the trial
judge's analyses and first evaluate the legal sufficiency of the evidence.7 4
An appellate court can usually judge the legal sufficiency of the evidence
from a written record without an evidentiary hearing. 5 If the appellate
court determines that the evidence was legally insufficient, the appellate
court must grant an acquittal barring retrial.7 ' A finding of legally suffi-
cient evidence initiates the factual review of the trial judge's denial of
a new trial.77 The trial judge, however, is in a better position than the
appellate court to evaluate the necessity of a new trial for several reasons.7 1
A written record cannot convey witness demeanor and the impact cer-
tain witnesses may have had on the jury.9 The record also often cannot
convey whether or not the trial judge has refused to grant a new trial
on weight of the evidence.0 Written explanations of reasons for rulings
68 See supra text accompanying notes 9-16 (acquittal based on insufficient evidence
prohibits retrial).
" Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-44 (1982). In Tibbs, the Supreme Court found that
a court may make a weight of the evidence evaluation only after the court has determined
that the government has presented legally sufficient evidence. Id.
" Id. at 42; see supra text accompanying notes 44-45 (appellate court acting as thir-
teenth juror).
"' Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-47 (1982).
7 Id.
" Id. at 36-40.
7' See supra text accompanying notes 66-72 (systematic evaluation method for trial
judges).
75 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979).
7' Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
11 See supra note 69 (motion for new trial considered after evaluation of motion for
acquittal and evidentiary sufficiency).
7' See infra text accompanying notes 79-84 (trial judge's presence at trial enables him
to evaluate witness credibility whereas appellate courts must depend on written record);
cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979) (written record almost always shows simple
sufficiency of the evidence; infra note 86 (appellate court should defer to state court eviden-
tiary rulings unless ruling violates due process).
I Cf. infra text accompanying notes 80-84 (appellate courts should defer to trial judges'
credibility determination and reasons for granting acquittal).
' See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516-17 (1978). In Washington, the trial judge
ordered a mistrial without explaining his reasoning. Id. at 501. On review, the Supreme
Court held that the trial court need not specifically find "manifest necessity" to grant a
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are helpful and desirable, but not constitutionally required. 1 Since the
trial judge has review power over jury verdicts,' the appellate court should
defer to the trial judge's denial of a new trial." If the appellate court
disagrees with the trial judge's ruling on the new trial motion, the ap-
pellate court could remand the ruling for reconsideration. 4
The double jeopardy clause limits the government's right to appeal
the trial judge's rulings." Although a judgment of acquittal following a
jury verdict of guilty deserves special weight,86 an acquittal by a trial.
judge does not necessarily prevent a government appeal. The govern-
valid mistrial. Id. at 517. The Supreme Court reasoned that the record provided sufficient
justification for the state court ruling. Id. at 516. The United States Constitution does not
require a full explanation of the decision to declare a mistrial. Id. at 516-17. Of course,
disclosure by the trial judge of the basis for the ruling facilitates review of the ruling.
Id. at 517. See supra note 45 (manifest necessity retrials).
81 Cf.id. at 516-17 (1978) (Constitution does not require written explanation for mistrial).
81 See FED. R. CamI. P. 29, 33 (trial judges review motions for new trial and acquittal
following jury verdicts).
3 Carter v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 777, 782-84 (5th Cir. 1982); see infra note 89 (discussion
of Carter). Carter is the first federal case to interpret carefully the Tibbs distinction be-
tween weight and sufficiency of the evidence. See Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 305
n.15 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Tibbs for the general proposition that weight of evidence rever-
sal is exception to rule precluding prosecution when defendant has in fact or effect won
acquittal on merits); United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 773 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Tibbs
as support for proposition that courts should construe narrowly exception to rule barring
retrial after acquittal). In Carter, the Fifth Circuit ruled that appellate courts must accept
the state court's characterization of reasons for reversal. 691 F.2d at 782. Unless the state
court's characterization conflicts with due process, the appellate court should defer to the
state court's determination of insufficient evidence, insufficient weight of the evidence or
trial error. Id. Appellate courts should respect state court judgments based on state stan-
dards of evidentiary sufficiency, even if the ruling is .incorrect. Id. at 784.
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 36-40 (1982).
" See infra text accompanying notes 86-92 (Wilson rule barring governmental appeal
when reversal of acquittal would subject defendant to second trial).
' United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980). Acquittals deserve special
weight since an acquittal terminates a proceeding after jeopardy has attached. United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1977). When a defendant has won an ac-
quittal on the merits of his defense, a presumption exists for the preclusion of reprosecu-
tion. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 305 n.15 (5th Cir. 1982); see supra note 2 (finality
of judgments). An acquittal should prevent repeated government attempts to convict the
defendant. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Subsequent trials subject
the defendant to embarrassment, expense, anxiety, and insecurity. Id. Acquittals may bar
subsequent prosecutions for the same offense even if erroneous. United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 671 (1896); see Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978) (acquittal bars
retrial even if based on egregiously erroneous foundation); Fong Foo v. United States, 369
U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (same). The double jeopardy policy barring retrial is so important that
courts should narrowly construe exceptions to the rule. United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d
769, 773 (3d Cir. 1982).
Criminal Appeals Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. S 3731 (1976). Section 3731 of title eighteen
of the United States Code amended the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch. 2564, Pub. L.
No. 59-223, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907), which authorized government appeals only in limited situa-
tions. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 318 (1892) (statutory authorization necessary
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ment may appeal a judgment of acquittal whenever constitutionally
permissible." Prior to Tibbs, the Supreme Court had established that the
United States Constitution prevented government appeal of an acquittal
when reversal of the acquittal would subject the defendant to retrial.89
In United States v. Wilson," the Supreme Court reasoned that the defend-
ant would not suffer from reprosecution when a reversal of judgment of
acquittal would result only in reinstatement of a jury's verdict of guilty. 1
The Wilson Court noted that the double jeopardy clause primarily pro-
tects criminal defendants against multiple prosecutions. 2 The Tibbs Court
for government appeal in criminal cases). Legislative history of the Criminal Appeals Act
of 1970 indicates that Congress intended to broaden the government's right to appeal by
allowing courts to define the constitutional boundaries of double jeopardy. S. REP. No. 1296,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970); see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337-39 (1975). In
Wilson, the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history surrounding the 1970 Act. 420
U.S. at 337-39. The Conference Committee rejected language that would have permitted
a government appeal from any termination of a prosecution in favor of a defendant. Id.
at 338. The Committee also omitted a provision that would have barred government appeal
of an acquittal. Id. The resulting language indicates that Congress intended to bar only
unconstitutional government appeals. Id. at 339. Congress did not define the constitutional
limits of government appeals, allowing the courts to determine constitutional boundaries. Id.
18 U.S.C. S 3731 (1976). The government has no right of appeal in criminal cases
absent explicit statutory authority. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975). Sec-
tion 3731 of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1970 allows government appeals from any deci-
sion, judgment, or order dismissing an indictment except when the double jeopardy clause
prohibits retrial. 18 U.S.C. S 3731 (1976); see supra note 87 (courts define constitutional boun-
daries of government appeals). If the prosecutor does not appeal to delay trial and if ex-
cluded evidence is material to the proceedings, the government may appeal an order sup-
pressing or excluding evidence, as long as the appeal is made before the defendant has
been put into jeopardy. Id. Whether or not the Constitution permits the appeal is a judicial
decision. See generally United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 336-42 (legislative history of
18 U.S.C. S 3731); Note, Double Jeopardy and Post-Verdict Judgments of Acquittal, 40 WASH.
& LEE L. REv.669, 670-72 & nn.3-8 (1983) (legislative history and purpose of the Criminal
Appeals Act).
' United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975).
90 Id.
" Id. at 336. In Wilson, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Id. at 333. On the defen-
dant's motion, the district court dismissed the indictment due to prejudicial delay. Id. The
government appealed under S 3731 of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1970. Id.; see 18 U.S.C.
S 3731 (1976); supra notes 87-88 (government's right to appeal under Act). The Third Circuit
held that double jeopardy barred the government's appeal. 420 U.S. at 333. The Supreme
Court reversed, reasoning that the Constitution provides no absolute ban on appeals by
the state. Id. at 342.
" 420 U.S. at 342. The Wilson Court concluded that double jeopardy is not directed
at government appeals when retrial is not an option. Id. See generally supra notes 53-62
and accompanying text (arguments against retrial). Double jeopardy protects a defendant
from double punishment for the same offense. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399
(1938) (double jeopardy primarily prohibits double punishment); see also One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-36 (1972) (double jeopardy protects against
multiple punishment); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919) (double punishment
prohibited by double jeopardy); Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-69 (1873) (double
jeopardy forbids multiple punishment). See generally Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials,
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formulated an exception to the Wilson rule by allowing a new trial follow-
ing a weight of the evidence reversal of an acquittal.9"
To reconcile Tibbs with Wilson, the Supreme Court in Tibbs should
have reviewed the appellate court actions as a ruling on a motion for new
trial instead of as a grant of a new trial resulting from reversal of an
acquittal.94 The Tibbs Court should have characterized the outcome of the
appeal as a new trial justified by weight of the evidence and impliedly
requested by the defendant.95 By referring to the result as the reversal
of an acquittal based on weight of the evidence, the Tibbs Court carved
an exception to the Wilson rule barriig government appeal of an acquit-
tal when reversal of the acquittal would result in retrial for the defendant.
6
Although the Wilson bar against retrial was designed to protect
defendants, a Tibbs new trial based on weight of the evidence may benefit
125 U. PA. L. REv. 449, 454 (1977) (finality of judgment and prevention of multiple
punishments embodied in double jeopardy clause); Kirk, "Jeopardy" During the Period of
the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. Rav. 602, 603 (1934) (no court should try or punish a defendant
twice for same offense).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 26-45 (Tibbs Court allowed retrial after weight
of evidence reversal); supra text accompanying notes 89-92 (Wilson rule barring govern-
ment appeal of acquittal when retrial possible).
" See infra text accompanying notes 95-96 (Tibbs Court could have characterized reversal
as ruling on new trial, avoiding conflict with Wilson rule barring reversal of acquittal when
defendant subject to retrial). Before Tibbs, the trial judge usually did not weigh evidence
or assess credibility when determining the merits of a defendant's acquittal motion. Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). In Burks, the Supreme Court cautioned that the
trial judge should not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility. Id.; see United States
v. Wolfenbarger, 426 F.2d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 1970) (court should not weigh evidence but
should view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution to determine sufficiency of
evidence for conviction); United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969) (same);
McClard v. United States, 386 F.2d 495, 497 (8th Cir. 1967) (same); Curley v. United States,
160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947); supra text accompany-
ing notes 7-16 (discussion of Jackson standard that requires trial judge to determine eviden-
tiary sufficiency and leave question of weight and credibility to jury); infra text accompa-
nying notes 119-24 (jury's traditional factfinding role).
In contrast, judges are permitted to weigh the evidence when considering the defen-
dant's motion for a new trial. United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980).
In Lincoln, the defendant moved for a new trial on weight of the evidence. Id. The Fifth
Circuit permitted the trial court to weigh the evidence to convict even if the evidence had
legal sufficiency. Id. The trial judge could direct a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence or a miscarriage of justice. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (new trial). If the judge ruled
that the jury's verdict contradicted the weight of the evidence, the judge could direct a
new trial. United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1969). The trial judge has broader
discretion to weigh credibility than the appellate court. Id. The judge may direct a new
trial if the jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence or the verdict constitutes
a miscarriage of justice. Id.
" See supra text accompanying notes 65-84 (systematic evaluation of motions for new
trial and acquittal in which weight of evidence is determination made when considering
actual or implied motion for new trial).
' See supra text accompanying notes 26-45 (Tibbs Court allowed retrial based on weight
of evidence); supra text accompanying notes 89-92 (Wilson rule bars government appeal
of acquittal when retrial possible).
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a criminal defendant.' The government has a second opportunity to con-
vict, but the defendant also receives another chance to vindicate himself. 8
The possibility of a new trial enables the court to prevent punishment
of the innocent and vindication of the guilty.9 If conviction and acquittal
are the sole options for trial and appellate courts, the courts, considering
that society's interest in punishing criminals supersedes a defendant's in-
terest in a grant of immunity from punishment, might affirm a conviction
rather than acquit when the evidence borders on insufficiency.10 Every
trial containing reversible error should not result in immunity to the
defendant.'' A new trial based on a weight of the evidence reversal,
therefore, is a viable option to prevent unjustified immunity or punish-
ment for the defendant. When a trial judge or appellate court grants a
new trial, both the accused and the state receive another opportunity to
prove their cases."2
'7 See infra note 98 (possibility that passage of time weakens government's case). The
Supreme Court has sanctioned retrial of criminal defendants. See, e.g., United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 (1980) (no limits on retrial of defendant who succeeds in
setting aside conviction); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (retrial after reversal
of acquittal following guilty verdict is not form of government oppression barred by double
jeopardy); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969) (double jeopardy does not pro-
hibit second trial after defendant's successful reversal of post-verdict acquittal).
" Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-44 & n.19 (1982). In Tibbs, the Court noted that
the passage of time may weaken the state's case. Id. at 43-44 n.19. Over time, witnesses
may lose the ability to recall clearly the events in question. Id. A jury may be less likely
to convict the accused on the basis of a blurred recollection by the prosecutrix. Id.
See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-43 (1982).
100 See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (grant of immunity from punish-
ment to defendant burdens society).
101 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978). Courts may subject a defendant to
a new trial following reversal of a guilty verdict due to procedural error. United States
v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964). In United States v. Wilson, the Supreme Court concluded
that a defendant has no legitimate claim of double jeopardy when the trial judge erron-
eously acquits after a jury guilty verdict. 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975). See 420 U.S. at 341 n.9
(error in proceedings no bar to retrial); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425 (1960)
(same); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896) (same). But see Sanabria v. United
States, 437 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1978) (judge's erroneous evidentiary ruling led to acquittal for
insufficient evidence and barred retrial); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1971)
(retrial barred when trial judge abused discretion by discharging jury because judge feared
taxpayer witnesses would incriminate themselves).
Double jeopardy protection may not prevent a second prosecution if the defendant's
appeal is based on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence. United States v. DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980); see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 84 (1978) (government ap-
peal allowed when defendant moved to dismiss two counts of indictment based on prein-
dictment delay); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 34 (1977) (double jeopardy no bar to
retrial when defendant moved to dismiss information for failure to allege an element of
the crime); cf. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961) (judge dismissed jury and
allowed retrial as in defendant's best interest since questioning might have led to evidence
of previous crimes).
10 Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-44 (1982).
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Retrial, however, will not always benefit the defendant.1"3 Double
jeopardy cases reiterate the potential evils of retrial. 4 A new trial en-
tails the risk that the state will use superior resources to oppress defend-
ants incapable of providing adequate multiple defenses. 105 The accused
should be able to prepare his defense with the expectation that one trial
will resolve his guilt or innocence.0 0 Repeated trials could encourage the
defendant to conserve resources in the original trial anticipating future
litigation." By allowing an unlimited number of successive trials based
on weight of the evidence, the Tibbs decision increases the possibility that
repeated prosecutions will be detrimental to the defendant.' When the
prosecution fails to muster sufficient evidence to convict in the first trial,
courts should not subject the defendant to the embarrassment, expense,
ordeal, anxiety, and insecurity of readjudication."' Repeated attempts to
10 See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text (infringement on defendant's rights
through successive trials).
I" United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 347 n.16 (1975); see Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S.
31, 44 (1982). In Tibbs, the Court warned that retrial allows repeated prosecutorial sallies
in an attempt to obtain the defendant's conviction. Id. Successive trials unfairly burden
the defendant by allowing the government to hone trial strategies. Id. The risk of convic-
tion through sheer governmental perseverance increases with each new trial. Id.
"I United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). A new trial gives
the government the proverbial "second bite at the apple". Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
1, 17 (1978). Readjudication gives the government repeated opportunities to convict. Ben-
ton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969). Retrial carries the risk of official abuse. Westen,
supra note 3, at 1036. The government could burden the defense with excessive discovery.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (discovery and inspection). Retrial also allows the state to use the
defendant's previous trial strategy to bolster its case. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 43-44
n.19 (1982). If the state cannot present additional evidence, retrial serves no purpose other
than harassment of the accused. Id. at 48 (White, J., dissenting).
10 Note, Double Jeopardy and Federal Prosecution After State Jury Acquittal, 80 MICH.
L. REV. 1073, 1082 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Prosecution After Acquittal]; see infra note
124 (presumption of unfairness of retrial).
101 Prosecution After Acquittal, supra note 106, at 1082. When a defendant has expended
all of his resources and successfully obtained an acquittal, retrial enhances the possibility
that a second trial will result in a conviction. Id. at 1083; see supra notes 104-105 (successful
trials increase probability of guilty verdicts).
1"I Contra Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) (double jeopardy prevents state from
honing trial strategies and perfecting evidence through successive trials). Cf. Green v. United
States, 355 US. 184, 187-88 (1957). The United States Constitution prevents repeated pros-
ecution through the double jeopardy clause. Id. The double jeopardy clause, therefore,
represents the intent of the framers of the Constitution to limit the government to a single
trial. Id. Retrials based on weight of the evidence are an exception to the double jeopardy
bar against a second prosecution. See supra text accompanying notes 26-45 (weight of evidence
reversals permit retrial following jury verdicts of guilty).
11 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Double jeopardy prohibits retrial
when the government fails to present sufficient evidence in the first proceeding. United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 215,16 (1978);
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-88
(1975); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 187.
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convict enhance the possibility that a new jury will find the innocent
guilty.11 Successive trials also erode public trust in the judicial system
and the finality of judgments.'
Before Tibbs, trial judges usually did not exercise the option of suc-
cessive trials based on weight of the evidence reversals of jury verdicts
of guilty."' Trial judges had to be decisive and parse the evidence to deter-
mine whether sufficient evidence supported the guilty verdict or whether
insufficient evidence required acquittal.13 A new trial based on weight
of the evidence allows a timorous judge to declare insufficient weight of
the evidence, order a retrial, and hope that the next jury relieves him
of the obligation to acquit."" Theoretically, prosecutors could encourage
judges to base all post-verdict decisions following jury guilty verdicts on
weight of the evidence."' The difficulty of distinguishing between weight
"1 United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 796 (1969). Government perseverance alone creates the risk of erroneous conviction.
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,41-42 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 103-107 (potential
evils of retrial include risk that repeated prosecutions burden defendants financially).
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized circumstances in which double jeopardy
should not bar retrial. See supra note 45 (manifest necessity reversals permit retrial); supra
note 101 (retrial permitted when reversal based on procedural error or grounds unrelated
to guilt or innocence); infra note 115 (retrial possible when prosecutor does not intentially
manipulate mistrial).
" Prosecution After Acquittal, supra note 106, at 1082; see supra note 2 (double jeopardy
protects finality of judgments).
,12 See supra text accompanying notes 54-65 (Burks Court ruled on basis of sufficiency
or insufficiency only while Hudson Court first suggested weight of evidence standard used
in Tibbs). In Florida, for example, state law permitted review of the weight of the evidence
as an additional procedural safeguard for criminal defendants. See supra note 32 and text
accompanying notes 32-38 (Florida appellate rule requiring distinction between weight of
evidence and sufficiency of evidence).
11I See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (appellate court does not weigh
evidence, but assesses evidence in light most favorable to prosecution to determine if ra-
tional factfinder could have found guilt beyond reasonable doubt); Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1978) (trial judges should not weigh evidence or assess witness credibil-
ity, but determine whether evidence is legally sufficient to sustain jury's guilty verdict);
supra note 10 (Jackson standard of review).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 103-107 (successive trials present increased op-
portunity for government to convict).
"' Carter v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir. 1982). In Carter, the defendant appealed
his embezzlement conviction. Carter v. State, 510 S.W.2d 323, 324, (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
The state contended that the president of the corporation owned the checks that Carter
converted to his own use. Id. at 325-26. The prosecution did not prove the president's owner-
ship, and therefore failed to prove an essential element of the crime. Id. The appellate court
reversed Carter's conviction. Id. at 326. The jury convicted Carter on retrial and Carter
petitioned the Fifth Circuit for rehearing in light of Tibbs. 691 F.2d at 777; Tibbs v. Florida,
457, U.S. 31 (1982). The Carter court emphasized that the appellate court should accept
the characterization of the state court's reasons for reversal. Id. at 782. The Fifth Circuit
held that the Texas appellate court's reversal was for insufficient evidence and denied rehear-
ing. Id. at 785. The Carter court warned that the "inevitable consequence of Tibbs is that
unsuccessful prosecutors will be tempted to recast every reversal for evidentiary suffi-
ciency by an appellate court as a reversal based on weight so as to gain the 'second bite
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of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence enhances the potential for
prosecutorial and judicial confusion and abuse.'16 A new trial based on
weight of the evidence indicates that the evidence was legally sufficient
to convict." 7 Arguably, the only purpose in permitting a second trial would
be to allow the state to present additional evidence to bolster its case. 8
A trial judge who grants a second trial on weight of the evidence
might be invading the jury's traditional factfinding role."' As a factfind-
ing body, the jury should resolve conflicting testimony, weigh contradic-
tory evidence, and draw inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts."'
The issue of witness credibility is especially well-suited to resolution by
a properly instructed jury."' The jury observes direct examination and
of the apple.'" Id. at 778. The Supreme Court noted that the petitioner in Tibbs predicted
that the distinction between weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence would
encourage appellate judges to base reversals on weight. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-45
(1982). The Supreme Court rejected petitioner Tibb's argument. Id.; see id. 457 U.S. at 43-44
nn.18 & 20 (appellate judges commonly distinguish weight of evidence from sufficiency of
evidence and distinction would not lead to successive trials).
The Supreme Court has acted to minimize prosecutorial manipulation of trial judges'
rulings in other circumstances. The Court has ruled that when a prosecutor intentionally
manipulates a mistrial, the mistrial becomes an acquittal barring retrial. United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980). The motives of the prosecutor determine whether
double jeopardy bars retrial for prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d
769, 774 (3d Cir. 1982). If the court finds no evidence of the prosecutor's intent to cause
a mistrial, the prosecutor's action does not invoke double jeopardy protection. Id. at 778.
The prosecutor need not intend specifically to cause a mistrial to trigger double jeopardy
protection. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675-79 (1982). When prosecutorial misconduct
is intentibnal and intended to prejudice the defendant, double jeopardy bars retrial. Id.
Compare United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 606, 611 (1976) (no finding of judicial or prosecutorial
bad faith indicating intent to harrass or prejudice defendant;, and Illinois v. Somerville,
410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973) (no prosecutorial overreaching when faulty indictment triggered
mistrial) and Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 1982) (prosecutorial overreaching
insufficient to prevent retrial); with Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735-36 (1963)
(retrial barred when prosecution moved to dismiss jury because of missing key witnesses
and prosecutor knew at jury selection that witnesses were unavailable).
,,l See supra text accompanying notes 112-15 (potential abuse of weight of evidence
reversals); see also Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 738 (1963) (doubt resolved in
favor of citizen's liberty rather than permitting unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial
discretion).
" See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 38 (1982) (difference between reviewing sufficiency
of evidence and weight of evidence); id. 457 U.S. at 47-48 (White, J., dissenting) (court must
first determine if evidence meets Burks sufficiency requirement, then review weight of
evidence); see supra notes 9-25 and accompanying text (Burks application of Jackson stan-
dard of evidentiary sufficiency).
... Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 47-48 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice
White reasoned that if the state presented the same evidence in a second trial, the state
court should reverse the conviction for insufficient weight of the evidence. Id. If the state
has no new evidence, reprosecution only would harrass the defendant. Id. at 48.
,, See infra text accompanying notes 120-24 (jury's factfinding role).
12 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In Jackson, the Supreme Court noted
that judges should preserve the jury's findings by viewing all evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. Id.
"I Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966).
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cross-examination and is capable of judging witness veracity." Juries have
the responsibility of protecting the accused from a potentially arbitrary
and oppressive government that controls criminal sanctions.'" When a
jury resolves the facts in favor of the prosecution, the trial court should
defer to the jury's verdict unless the evidence is legally insufficient to
convict. 2 '
The Tibbs Court, however, found that judicial oversight of juries re-
quires the flexibility of a retrial based on weight of the evidence in addi-
tion to the option of acquittal based on insufficient evidence. '25 The rever-
sal, by a trial judge or appellate court of a jury's guilty verdict, based
on weight of the evidence permits a second trial, while a reversal based
on legally insufficient evidence prevents retrial.'26 A new trial affords the
" Id. Cross-examination is an established safeguard of the Anglo-American legal system
that preserves the defendant's right to confrontation. Id. Credibility is a matter for the
jury that observes the cross-examination. United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 707
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). When witnesses' credibility evidence con-
flicts, the jury's opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor is important. United States
v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1969).
123 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977).
12 See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (court should not weigh evidence
or judge credibility, but court should sustain jury verdict if, when viewed in light most
favorable to government, substantial evidence supports verdict); United States v. Lincoln,
630 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 (8th Cir. 1980) (evidence sufficient to support verdict if substantial
evidence, including circumstantial evidence, justifies inference of guilt irrespective of counter-
vailing testimony). But see Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 738 (1963) (rather than
reassess evidentiary weight through weight of evidence reversals, court should resolve
doubt in favor of citizen's liberty).
Civil law resolves issues in favor of a preponderance of the evidence. Braud v. Kinchen,
310 So.2d 657, 659 (La. Ct. App. 1975). A preponderance of the evidence is evidence that
has greater weight or is more convincing than evidence offered in opposition. Id. A
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the conclusion raised by the proponent
of the evidence is more probable than not. Id. The American system of criminal justice
presumes innocence and requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States
v. Friday, 404 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (E.D. Mich. 1975). If the prosecution failed to present
evidence legally sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court should ac-
quit the defendant. See supra notes 9-25 and accompanying text (Jackson standard of review
for legally insufficient evidence and Burks application of Jackson standard). The require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt facilitates fourteenth amendment due process.
See, e.g., Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam) (courts cannot require
defendants to prove innocence beyond reasonable doubt); Ivan v. City of New York, 407
U.S. 203, 204 (1972) (per curiam) (reasonable doubt reduces risks of convictions based on
factual error); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972) (presumption of innocence re-
quires high standard of proof for guilt). The presumption of innocence requires the govern-
ment to defer to the jury's verdict and bear the risks and consequences of erroneous
acquittals. Cf. BuIlington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) (in capital sentencing, govern-
ment should bear risk and consequences when jury gives defendant life sentence and effec-
tively acquits defendant of death penalty); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)
(defendant sentenced to life imprisonment cannot receive death penalty upon retrial).
"1 See supra text accompanying notes 26-45 (reviewing body should review jury's ver-
dict to determine if weight of evidence requires retrial).
" See supra notes 17-45 and accompanying text (Burks application of legally insuffi-
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state and the defendant another opportunity to adjudicate guilt or
innocence."= Retrial, however, can result in capricious verdicts and hard-
ship for defendants."8 Courts, therefore, should be cautious in granting
weight of the evidence exceptions to the double jeopardy bar against
reprosecution.'1
The Tibbs weight of the evidence exception allowing retrial poten-
tially is not only subject to abuse, but also is difficult to apply." The distinc-
tion between sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence is
unclear."' Courts can judge more easily the evidentiary weight and suffi-
ciency through systematic evaluation."2 Trial judges first should consider
the legal sufficiency of the evidence to decide between acquittal and
conviction."= If the judge concludes that the evidence was sufficient ac-
cording to the standard of Jackson and Burks," the judge should then
evaluate the weight of the evidence.115 According to Hudson and Tibbs,
the trial judge must act as a thirteenth juror to consider evidentiary weight
and the advisability of a new trial. ' The appellate court also should deter-
mine first legal sufficiency and then evidentiary weight. 37 Although the
appellate court can judge the legal sufficiency of the evidence as well as
the trial court, the appellate court cannot function as a thirteenth juror. 8'
The appellate court, therefore, should defer to the trial judge's ruling on
cieni evidence as barring retrial while Tibbs allows retrial following weight of evidence
reversal).
12 See supra text accompanying notes 97-102 (benefits of retrial to state and defendant).
See supra text accompanying notes 104-111 (pitfalls of retrial).
'z United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975). The double jeopardy policy against
multiple prosecution is important, and courts should hesitate to allow exceptions. Id.; see
supra notes 45, 46, 101, 115 (exceptions to double jeopardy bar against retrial); supra notes
103-111, 128 and accompanying text (potential evils of retrial).
'1 See supra note 7 (distinction between weight of evidence and sufficiency of evidence
unclear); text accompanying notes 46-53 (problems in discerning weight of evidence from
sufficiency of evidence).
131 See supra note 7 (elusive quality of distinction between weight of evidence and suffi-
ciency of evidence).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 64-77 (systematic method for evaluation of mo-
tions for new trial and acquittal).
133 Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 47-48 (White, J., dissenting); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 66-69 (court should determine whether evidence is legally sufficient to support
jury's verdict of guilty before evaluating weight of evidence).
13 See supra notes 9-25 and accompanying text (Jackson standard for review of evident-
iary sufficiency and Burks application of Jackson standard).
13 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72 (second step in evaluating evidence is weight
of evidence standard for considering motions for new trial).
13 Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-43 (1982); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 44-45
(1981); see supra, text accompanying notes 44-45 and 56-63 (trial judges and appellate courts
function as thirteenth jurors to evaluate weight of evidence).
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 74-77 (appellate courts first evaluate evidentiary
sufficiency, then weight of evidence).
135 See supra text accompanying notes 78-84 (appellate courts should hesitate to weigh
evidence and should remand to trial courts for reconsideration of motions for new trial).
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the new trial motion or remand for further consideration by the trial
court. '" 9
The Tibbs Court still would have allowed retrial if the trial and ap-
pellate courts had used the systematic method of evaluating actual or im-
plicit motions for new trial and acquittal.4 ° In Tibbs, the Florida Supreme
Court examined the motion for acquittal on the weight of the evidence,
the same basis the court would have used to consider a motion for a new
trial.' The confusion in the Tibbs decision is semantic." The result, never-
theless, is valid. Denial of a new trial, even though weight of the evidence
justified retrial, would have abolished the possibility of new trials for
criminal defendants on grounds other than newly discovered evidence."'
Wholesale grants of new trials based on weight of the evidence, however,
could lead to prosecutorial and judicial abuse.' A new trial is a procedural
safeguard that effectively protects criminal defendants only when courts
carefully and systematically consider the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence. 4 '
MARY MILLER JOHNSTON
' See supra notes 78, 80, 83 (trial judges in better postion to evaluate evidentiary
weight than appellate courts).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 141-43 (appellate court should have character-
ized ruling as new trial necessitated by weight of evidence instead of as reversal of acquit-
tal based on weight of evidence).
"' Tibbs. v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-47 (1982).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 94-96 (Tibbs Court could have avoided formulating
exception to Wilson rule barring retrial after reversal of post-verdict acquittal by characteriz-
ing post-verdict reversal as ruling on motion for new trial instead of as ruling on validity
of post-verdict acquittal).
143 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (judges may grant motions for new trial to prevent miscar-
riage of justice on grounds that weight of evidence requires retrial); see also supra notes
45, 46, 94, 101, 115 (other proper grounds for grant of new trial).
" See supra text accompanying notes 103-118 (potential abuse of Tibbs grant of new
trials based on weight of evidence).
' See supra text accompanying notes 64-84 (systematic method for evaluation of motions
for new trial and acquittal).
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